Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence

Using a simple, double-blind dictator experiment, we examine the extent to which subjects\u27 choices of distributive shares are influenced by unearned social position. We measure social position by the initial distributive shares (resources) and the subjects\u27 ability to determine the final distributive shares (power). We find that subjects\u27 decisions are consistent with Rawls\u27 (1971) hypothesis that individuals expect a greater share when in a position with more power and initial resources. Finally, we test if subjects\u27 choices under a laboratory veil of ignorance are consistent with Rawls\u27 concept of distributive justice. Veiled individuals exhibit preferences that are less risk-averse and have greater variance than Rawls hypothesized. [excerpt

Multi-Period Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryover: Theory and Experimental Evidence

The majority of theoretical and experimental research stemming from Tullock’s (1980) model of rent-seeking considers static, single-period contests. This paper contributes to a growing body of research on multi-period rent-seeking contests by developing and experimentally testing a model in which a player’s effort affects the probability of winning a contest in both the current and future periods. Theory predicts that rent-seeking effort will be shifted forward from later to earlier periods, with no change in overall rent-seeking expenditures relative to the static contest. Experimental results indicate a significant shift forward when “carryover” is present and that the amount shifted is directly related to the carryover rate. Finally, although experimental expenditures are greater than the equilibrium predictions, overall rent-seeking effort in the carryover contests is lower than in similar static contests.

A Behavioral Model of Multilateral Bargaining and Holdout: Theory with Experimental Evidence

Bilateral monopoly, land assembly, and unanimous-consent Coasian bargaining present interesting strategic questions because they involve division of an economic surplus without competition to temper bargaining demands. We present a behavioral bargaining model in which payoff-maximizing proposers make offers to divide a surplus with one or more responders who are assumed to behave either strategically, or sincerely according to a minimum acceptable offer rule. We characterize equilibrium proposer and responder decisions under various scenarios regarding the number and type of responders, the number of bargaining periods, and the cost of delay. The model predictions are consistent with data from laboratory experiments.

An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This holdout problem is a common feature of the land-assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi-person groups, complementary exchanges, and holdout externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number of bargaining periods, and cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on average, a payoff-improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi-period bargaining treatments relative to single-period treatments, but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single-period treatments, both with and without delay costs. [excerpt

An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This “holdout problem” is a common feature of the land assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi-person groups, complementary exchanges, and holdout externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number of bargaining periods, and the cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on average, a payoff-improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi-period bargaining treatments relative to single-period treatments, but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single-period treatments, both with and without delay costs.

Institutions and Information in Multiple-Offer Multilateral Bargaining Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence

No abstract available

Spreading Propaganda in Cyberspace: Comparing Cyber-Resource Usage of Al Qaeda and ISIS

Terrorists in cyberspace are increasingly utilizing social media to promote their ideologies, recruit new members, and justify terrorist attacks and actions. This study explores the ways in which types of social media, message contents, and motives for spreading propaganda take shape in cyberspace. In order to empirically test these relations, we created a dataset with annual terrorism reports from 2011 to 2016. In our global cyberterrorism dataset, we used and connected cyber-resources (Facebook, online forum, Twitter mentions, websites, and YouTube videos) and legal documents of individual cases that were mentioned in the reports. The results show that YouTube videos were used primarily for propagating certain ideologies and for recruiting members for Al Qaeda and ISIS. Al Qaeda-affiliated cyberterrorists used YouTube videos as both individual sources and embedded sources for Facebook and Twitter, whereas ISIS-affiliated cyberterrorists predominantly used YouTube videos and Twitter posts

Impacts of coastal infrastructure on shoreline response to major hurricanes in southwest Louisiana

© The Author(s), 2022. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The definitive version was published in Cadigan, J., Bekkaye, J., Jafari, N., Zhu, L., Booth, A., Chen, Q., Raubenheimer, B., Harris, B., O’Connor, C., Lane, R., Kemp, G., Day, J., Day, J., & Ulloa, H. Impacts of coastal infrastructure on shoreline response to major hurricanes in southwest Louisiana. Frontiers in Built Environment, 8, (2022): 885215. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbuil.2022.885215.The Rockefeller Wildlife Refuge, located along the Chenier Plain in Southwest Louisiana, was the location of the sequential landfall of two major hurricanes in the 2020 hurricane season. To protect the rapidly retreating coastline along the Refuge, a system of breakwaters was constructed, which was partially completed by the 2020 hurricane season. Multi-institutional, multi-disciplinary rapid response deployments of wave gauges, piezometers, geotechnical measurements, vegetation sampling, and drone surveys were conducted before and after Hurricanes Laura and Delta along two transects in the Refuge; one protected by a breakwater system and one which was the natural, unprotected shoreline. Geomorphological changes were similar on both transects after Hurricane Laura, while after Delta there was higher inland sediment deposition on the natural shoreline. Floodwaters drained from the transect with breakwater protection more slowly than the natural shoreline, though topography profiles are similar, indicating a potential dampening or complex hydrodynamic interactions between the sediment—wetland—breakwater system. In addition, observations of a fluidized mud deposit in Rollover Bayou in the Refuge are presented and discussed in context of the maintenance of wetland elevation and stability in the sediment starved Chenier Plain.Funding for the study has been partially provided by the National Science Foundation through grants NSF 2139882, 2139883, 1829136, 1848650, and 1939275, as well as through the United States Army Corps of Engineers Regional Sediment Management program. Student support provided through the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program and the Louisiana Coastal Science Assistantship Program

A Trade Secret Model for Genomic Biobanking

Genomic biobanks present ethical challenges that are qualitatively unique and quantitatively unprecedented. Many critics have questioned whether the current system of informed consent can be meaningfully applied to genomic biobanking. Proposals for reform have come from many directions, but have tended to involve incremental change in current informed consent practice. This paper reports on our efforts to seek new ideas and approaches from those whom informed consent is designed to protect: research subjects. Our model emerged from semi-structured interviews with healthy volunteers who had been recruited to join either of two biobanks (some joined, some did not), and whom we encouraged to explain their concerns and how they understood the relationship between specimen contributors and biobanks. These subjects spoke about their DNA and the information it contains in ways that were strikingly evocative of the legal concept of the trade secret. They then described the terms and conditions under which they might let others study their DNA, and there was a compelling analogy to the commonplace practice of trade secret licensing. We propose a novel biobanking model based on this trade secret concept, and argue that it would be a practical, legal, and ethical improvement on the status quo

Perceptions of Patients with Inflammatory Bowel Diseases on Biobanking:

Little is known about beliefs, understanding and perceptions of biobanking among patients with inflammatory bowel diseases (IBD). We aimed to further understand perceptions of biobanking in the IBD community